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Abstract
The exponential increase of emissions linked to industrialization released into the air has been a developing
concern. Since the early 1960s the United States and other countries have begun recognizing the impacts of
acid precipitation, a result of emitted sulfur dioxide reacting with water molecules in the atmosphere to
produce harmful acid. Many researchers, climate policy makers, and government officials actively tried to
mitigate the origins and effects of acid precipitation, but little was accomplished the U.S. Congress passed and
President Carter signed the Acid Precipitation Act of 1980. This piece of legislation allocated resources from
the United States Government to allow a 10 year assessment of the causes and consequences of acid
precipitation with hopes of developing options for reducing known effects. Although this was a meaningful
step forward, few reform proposals have successfully negotiated the trepid path from theory to
implementation. A successful program must be realistic. The most conceivable idea of climate reform is not
about how to stop the output of SO2, but about how to control it. The SO2 allowance market, one of the most
successful climate policy instruments, was put into action in 1995. By providing economic incentives to firms
with lower emissions, it effectively limited the amount of harmful sulfur dioxide that was emitted into the
atmosphere while introducing fully marketable commodities—allowances—into the market. This paper
focuses the factors that determines the price for these allowances and discharge permits and assesses the
economic impacts of this incentive program.
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 The exponential increase of emissions linked 
to industrialization released into the air has been a 
developing concern. Since the early 1960s the United 
States and other countries have begun recognizing 
the impacts of acid precipitation, a result of emitted 
sulfur dioxide reacting with water molecules in the 
atmosphere to produce harmful acid. Many research-
ers, climate policy makers, and government officials 
actively tried to mitigate the origins and effects of 
acid precipitation, but little was accomplished the U.S. 
Congress passed and President Carter signed the Acid 
Precipitation Act of 1980. This piece of legislation al-
located resources from the United States Government 
to allow a 10 year assessment of the causes and conse-
quences of acid precipitation with hopes of developing 
options for reducing known effects. Although this was 
a meaningful step forward, few reform proposals have 
successfully negotiated the trepid path from theory 
to implementation. A successful program must be 
realistic. The most conceivable idea of climate reform 
is not about how to stop the output of SO2, but about 
how to control it.
 The SO2 allowance market, one of the most 
successful climate policy instruments, was put into 
action in 1995. By providing economic incentives to 
firms with lower emissions, it effectively limited the 
amount of harmful sulfur dioxide that was emitted 
into the atmosphere while introducing fully market-
able commodities—allowances—into the market. This 
paper focuses the factors that determines the price for 
these allowances and discharge permits and assesses 
the economic impacts of this incentive program.
II. Literature Review
 Though there is a vast amount of research on 
potentially harmful compounds emitted into the air 
and the economic policies that surround the manage-
ment of these emissions, this paper focuses the factors 
that determine the price for sulfur dioxide allowances 
and discharge permits and assesses the economic 
impacts of the Acid Rain Program.
 The SO2 market, like many other controlled 
emission markets, is a cap and trade system. In or-
der to understand the true functionality of the SO2 
market, Farber (2012) asserts that the cap and trade 
program entails, 
 “an emissions-reduction method that sets 
a rigid cap on emissions of a target pollutant for a 
constellation of regulated entities but also leaves them 
significant discretion to decide how to comply. An 
emissions trading scheme is based on the issuance of 
emission allowances… Once the pollution permits 
have been initially allocated, they are transferable, and 
sale prices function as free-market equivalents of pol-
lution taxes… [And] firms can reduce its emissions to 
profit by selling unneeded allowances to other present 
or prospective emitters or occasionally to non-emit-
ters entering the allowances market for speculative or 
environmentalist purposes.” (pg. 8) 
 
 The merit of the cap and trade program is 
within the design of the program itself, because the 
cap determines the total emissions reduction, while 
the trading process determines which sources re-
duce their emissions and to what extent. Through 
the adoption of the cap and trade program, “the SO2 
Emissions Trading program has reduced millions 
of tons of SO2 annually at a fraction of the expected 
cost” (Benkovic et al. 2001, pg 242). The prominence 
of this market came in 1990, “stipulating a 10 million-
ton SO2 emission reduction to protect human health, 
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ecosystems, visibility and materials from caused by 
SO2 emissions and sulfate particles” (Benkovic et al. 
2001, pg 243 ). This looming crisis inevitably initiat-
ed the process of the SO2 emissions trading program 
innovation for a new way to decrease this effect by 
placing a “mandatory ceiling or cap on emissions at 
8.95 million tons, about a 50 percent reduction from 
1980 levels” (Carlson, 1998, pg 371). This allows 
large electricity-generating sources the authorization 
to emit SO2 by allocation in the form of allowances 
while effectively controlling the amount of SO2 in 
the environment. As a result, the SO2 allowances 
have been much “cheaper than originally expected 
because industry found less expensive ways to reduce 
emissions, saving up to one billion dollars per year in 
compliance costs.” (Kumar 2010, pg. 624)
 Although an extensive amount of research 
has been done about the positive implications of the 
Acid Rain Program, less has been done to explain 
the price movements of the SO2 permit prices and 
how sensitive the prices are to economic variables. 
Though the fluctuations in permit price account for 
supply and demand of firms, there are many other 
critical indicators that play an important role as 
well. Burtraw and Szambelan evidence this in their 
research of the effectiveness of SO2 market in which 
they highlight explanations for price movements of 
permit price over time. Although they do not specify 
a finite number of factors they believe play the big-
gest role in price determination, they underscore 
a myriad of valuable signals that do. Burtraw and 
Szambelan (2009) hypothesize that there are many 
distinct factors within three main measures that 
determine the effectiveness of the SO2 trading pro-
gram. They are: environmental quality, the perfor-
mance of the market, and the economic assessment 
(pg. 6). In the commencement of the program, “total 
emissions in 1995, the first year of the program, were 
11.87 million tons—25 percent below 1990 levels 
and more than 35 percent below 1980 levels” (Bur-
traw, Szambelan, 2009, pg. 7). As a result, emissions 
from Phase 1 were well below annual allocations of 
emissions allowances to those units; yielding a bank 
(surplus of permits) totaling 11.6 million allow-
ances by the end of this phase. Henceforth, once 
firms had built up a bank of unused allowances, 
this created a vested self-interest of those banked 
credits, which provided an opportunity to harvest 
low-cost emissions reductions. In some cases, this 
brought changes in operations or other innovations 
into practice sooner than otherwise may have oc-
curred. As a result, because of the excess of unused 
allowances, “Phase I units reduced emissions by 57 
percent, while Phase II units reduced them by 14 
percent after 2000” (Burtraw, Szambelan, 2009, pg. 
7). It is argued that these emission reductions lead to 
increased air quality and subsequent improvements 
in public health. This outweighed both the economic 
benefits from reduced emissions and the costs of the 
program.
 
 The performance of the market is inevitably 
the most important measure of the program’s suc-
cess. Indicators within this measure, such as volume 
of trading between firms, are crucial determinants 
permit prices in the SO2 allowance market. Within 
the first three years of the The increased volatility 
within the market created a lot of traffic, and with 
the traffic came the participation of financial firms 
to broker the trading of the unused allowances. By 
2005, market activity had increased so much that “70 
percent of allowance trading taking place between 
economically unrelated firms was conducted by large 
electric companies and financial firms” (Burtraw, 
Szambelan, 2009, pg. 7). Burtraw and Szambelan 
then observed that at the beginning of the program 
“allowance prices were close to $150 per ton and fell 
to about $70 per ton by early 1996… and thereaf-
ter prices rose through 2003” (Burtraw, Szambelan, 
2009, pg. 9). This development and increased par-
ticipation in the market derived a pivotal finding: 
allowance prices began to represent the marginal cost 
of abatement, which in turn is influenced by the cost 
of fuels (natural gas and coal) and abatement tech-
nology. In response, the SO2 market began to reflect 
the marginal cost of regulation and the higher future 
value of banked allowances. 
 Their third measure of price determination, 
economic assessment, addresses the cost savings 
from the cap and trade program. One of the most 
cited observations from the program is that allow-
ance prices are significantly lower than policy mak-
ers predicted during the adoption of the program. A 
reason for this is because “changes in fuel markets, 
including the decline in the delivered cost of low-sul-
fur coal and in the price of natural gas and oil in the 
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1990s, contributed to a decline in emissions” (Bur-
traw, Szambelan, 2009, pg. 11). This effectively led 
to a decline in the marginal cost of reduction, which 
set the price for permits in the market. Furthermore, 
two major studies were conducted by Carlson et al. 
(2000) and Ellerman et al. (2000) to directly mea-
sure the cost savings attributable to allowance trad-
ing. They compared total costs under trading with a 
hypothetical regulatory policy that only capped the 
emissions and didn’t allow for trading. The findings 
for both studies are highly correlated and derived 
similar results that saw that cost savings under the 
cap and trade program attributed about 43-55 per-
cent more savings than under the regulatory policy 
that would have only controlled the emissions cap 
for each facility. These findings are substantial and 
extremely telling because they provided strong evi-
dence to back up one of original claims that policy 
makers hoped the system would create technological 
innovation. 
 It is believed that cost estimates have fallen 
over time because the trading program sparked new 
ways for companies to mitigate emissions at lower 
costs. Burtraw and Szambelan (2009) argue strongly 
that “ the flexibility under the trading program pro-
vided an impetus for investments in related markets, 
such as railroads and scrubber installations, that 
could not have been expected to the degree to which 
it occurred with a less flexible regulator program in 
place”(pg 12). One significant impact that was born 
out of innovation was the concept of fuel blend-
ing. Before the allowance market, the idea of fuel 
blending was thought to be infeasible; however, after 
the progression of the market, “experimentation 
in response to the allowance market demonstrated 
that the detrimental effects of blending low-sulfur 
coal with other coals were smaller than originally 
thought”(Burtraw, Szambelan, 2009, pg 13). In fact, 
firms began to combine mitigation efforts, and in ad-
dition to the conception of fuel blending, companies 
began to install scrubbers to achieve emissions re-
duction. Ellerman et al. (1997) estimated that about 
half as many scrubbers as were originally anticipated 
were installed during Phase I. In 1995, about 45 per-
cent of emissions reductions came from SO2 scrub-
bing, with the remaining 55 percent coming from 
switching to other fuels, such as low-sulfur coal. By 
2001, during Phase II, Ellerman (2003) estimated 
that the portion of emissions reductions attributable 
to expanded use of scrubbers only fell by 8 percent to 
about 37 percent. 
 These research efforts play pivotal roles in 
the comprehension of price determinants of the SO2 
market. Although this paper’s model displays slightly 
different determinants for the price of permits, it 
is important to note that Burtraw and Szambelan’s 
three measures provide invaluable insight to price 
discovery for permits. As we will see in the follow-
ing empirical model, efforts to observe the most 
important factors of permit price movements will 
be composed of contents from price movements in 
alternative fuels and substitute goods, environmental 
factors, and the initial allocation of allowances.
III. Theory
 For my theory section, I am going to incor-
porate three separate theoretical frameworks that will 
help explain my research hypothesis and empirical 
model. 
 The first theoretical framework that I will 
introduce is the Theory of Price. The price theory is 
an economic theory that contends that the price for 
any specific good/service is the relationship between 
the forces of supply and demand. The theory of price 
says that the point at which the benefit gained from 
those who demand a good or service meets the sell-
er’s marginal costs is the most optimal market price. 
Thus, in accordance to the SO2 market, the price at 
which allowance permits will be determined should 
be the point in which the demand for permits to emit 
by firms who have high marginal abatement costs 
is equal to the supply of permits of firms with low 
marginal abatement costs. In effect, larger firms who 
have high marginal mitigation costs due to the size 
of their firm will look to buy permits from smaller 
firms with low marginal mitigation costs and excess 
permits; and that equilibrium point will determine 
the price. More detail will be discussed further in my 
graphical representation below.
 The second theoretical framework is the Effi-
cient Market Hypothesis. This theory is important to 
the price theory because in order for the price theory 
to be effective the efficient market hypothesis theory 
must hold true. The Efficient Market Hypothesis is 
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an investment theory that states that it is impossible 
to beat the market because stock market efficiency 
causes existing share prices to always incorporate 
and reflect all relevant information. According to 
the theory, stocks always trade at their fair value on 
stock exchanges, making it impossible for investors 
to either purchase undervalued stocks or sell stocks 
for inflated prices. As such, it should be impossible to 
outperform the overall market through expert stock 
selection or market timing, and that the only way an 
investor can possibly obtain higher returns is by pur-
chasing riskier investments (Investopedia, pg 1). This 
theory has met controversial implications, due to the 
evidence that some individuals do beat the market. 
However, it is important to note that in a highly reg-
ulated system such as the SO2 market in which price 
is determined by the supply and demand of firms 
that are competing in it, firms will unintentionally 
reveal their marginal cost structures either by buying 
permits, selling them, or by banking them in order to 
continue efficiently meeting their business standards. 
The most applicable aspect of this theory to the SO2 
market system is that it adds some certainty by the 
participants concerning the future directions of the 
market. According to the theory, participants will act 
on their correct perception of the market allowing 
the market to move efficiently to equilibrium.
 
 Henceforth, to put it in graphical terms, con-
sider Figure 1 opposite, which incorporates the two 
theories of price theory and efficient market hypoth-
esis. In this scenario, the profitability of the emissions 
trading market can best be exemplified through the 
market for allowance permits. In Figure 1, the sup-
ply of allowance permits is capped at Q1, meaning, 
that is how many permits are available for alloca-
tion, and thus how much pollution to be emitted. 
Through the intersection of the completely inelastic 
total supply, which is the government limit on the 
supply of permits, the ultimate effect is the resulting 
quantities. Low abatement cost polluters reduces pol-
lution down from Q1 to Q2, while High abatement 
cost polluter reduces pollution down from Q1 to Q3. 
Therefore, this derives new prices for both sources 
and adequately derives an entirely new demand 
curve for permits, thus arriving at a tradable market 
for SO2. For MAChigh it is more costly to mitigate 
each additional unit of emissions, so in order to meet 
their production needs, they will simply adjust their 
demand for permits based on the markets reactions 
to demand shifters. If the price for their demand of 
permits is less than or equal to their marginal cost 
of abatement then they will buy the permits from 
the MAClow firms because it is cheaper for them 
to buy permits rather than reduce emissions. Ad-
ditionally, MAClow firms are more than willing to 
benefit from selling their permits because the price 
for their demand of permits is greater than or equal 
to their marginal cost of abatement and it will in-
crease revenue for them. Therefore, MAClow firm’s 
costs structure to mitigate emissions is lower than 
the MAChigh firms and the combination of interac-
tion between the firms develop the efficiency of the 
market. It is also important to note that Figure 1 only 
displays two hypothetical firms in order to make the 
situation more comprehensible. In the circumstance 
where many firms are involved and speculators enter 
the market for environmental reasons, the newly 
derived demand curves plays a much more essential 
role as many factors will shift the demand for permits 
positively or negatively.
Figure 1
 The incorporation of the theory of price, 
efficient market hypothesis, and the graphical frame-
work for the cap and trade system all play a role in 
the development of my hypothesis.
IV. Hypothesis 
 On the basis of the demand and supply 
theories developed above, I believe there is going to 
be a strong positive correlation between economic 
indicators and substitutable good prices as well as a 
negative correlation between environmental factors 
and the inelastic supply of permits with the prices of 
SO2 allowances. I believe that with shifts in these de-
terminants, demand for SO2 permits will be affected 
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and will ultimately be the deciding factor of the 
overall price. I hypothesize that the business cycles, 
the aggregate SO2 emission cap, natural gas prices, 
overall coal prices, drought levels, and temperature 
levels determine the price for SO2 allowance permits. 
Henceforth, I believe that increases in prices of natu-
ral gas and coal will increase the demand for SO2 
permits. Increases in unemployment, moisture and 
precipitation levels (drought index), temperature, 
and the SO2 cap (ceteris paribus) will decrease the 
demand for SO2 permits.
V. Empirical Model
 The data that is used in the regression is 
derived from a variety of sources, as described below. 
All relative prices are in real terms and are adjusted 
for inflation in terms of 2005 values using the Con-
sumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers. Data 
frequency is monthly from August 1994 to June 
2005. Graphs for the following price determinants 
can be found in the Appendix.
Allowance Prices: Monthly SO2 allowance prices 
were collected from the historical market price index 
of the Cantor Environmental Brokerage and are com-
plied from August 1994 to June 2005. 
Natural Gas Prices: Monthly Natural Gas prices are 
derived from the Federal Reserve Economic Data 
(FRED) Database and are compiled monthly from 
August 1994 to June 2005. The original prices are 
Henry Hub, LA average spot prices measured in 
dollars per million BTU. The prices range from $1.88 
per million BTU to $11.68 per million BTU with an 
average of $4.58 per million BTU and are a substitute 
for coal in electricity generating plants. Therefore, 
Natural Gas prices are expected to correlate positive-
ly with SO2 permit prices.
Coal Prices: The regression equation includes a US 
Coal Price index, CMCOALM, which provides aver-
age monthly spot prices from August 1994 to June 
2005. The CMCOALM index represents the coal 
prices in the industry as a whole. Power generating 
plants use a variety of types of coal, but the three 
most common types are Bituminous coal, Lignite 
coal, and Anthracite coal as provided by the U.S. En-
ergy Information Administration. The significance of 
each type of coal is as follows: Bituminous coal is the 
most common type of coal described as black coal 
that has a sulfur content weight range of .7%-4%. 
Lignite coal is often referred to as brown coal that 
is formed from naturally compressed heat and has a 
sulfur content weight of about .4%. Anthracite coal is 
a hard compact type of coal and is the least common 
type of coal used for power generating containing 
a sulfur content weight range of .6%-.77%. Each of 
these types of coal is used in coal power plants, and I 
assume that collectively, each will correlate positively 
with SO2 permit prices over time. 
Unemployment Rate: The civilian unemployment 
rates were collected monthly from the FRED data-
base and are used in this study to represent business 
cycles over time. The overlying assumption is that 
the unemployment rate will capture expansionary 
or contractionary periods in the economy. This will 
have a negative relationship with the prices of SO2 
permits depending on the state of the economy.
Drought Index: The Palmer Severity Drought Index 
(PDSI) is a measurement of dryness based on precip-
itation and temperature levels and attempts to mea-
sure the duration and intensity of long-term drought 
inducing circulation patterns. The values of the PDSI 
range from -4 to +4, with -4 being extreme drought 
and +4 being extreme moisture. The significance of 
the PDSI is to capture the extent of the use of Hydro-
power, which is a substitute for coal is the context 
that power generating plants can use H2O to gener-
ate power instead of the use of coal. In months of 
moisture, power generating plants will use less coal 
and turn to water as a form of power generation. But, 
in months of drought, plants will have no choice but 
to use coal or other substitutes as a form of power 
generation. Therefore, in periods of increased mois-
ture and precipitation, the correlation between the 
demand for permits and the drought index will be 
negative. For the accurateness of this study the PDSI 
values are used only for the Northeastern region, as 
that is where the concentration of Hydropower is 
used.
Temperature Index: The temperature index is an 
index used to survey the average temperature of the 
U.S. over time. The values were compiled from the 
National Climatic Data Center (NOAA) and are 
measured in Fahrenheit. The purpose of the tem-
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perature index is to capture the seasonal effects of 
power generation. In colder months when more heat 
is used, I predict that it will cost more energy as op-
posed to warmer months that will use less energy. 
This underlying assumption is based on the Annual 
Energy Cost report that states that consumers spend 
more on heating than on cooling; thus I predict that 
as average temperature increases, demand for SO2 
prices will decrease and permit prices will be affected 
negatively.
SO2 Allowance Cap: The SO2 allowance cap is the 
central figure for the supply of allowances. Every 
year, the government sets a cap on how much SO2 
emissions can be emitted, and that is the amount 
available for supply in that specific year. The data val-
ues were obtained from the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency’s annual report and are defined as LOG 
values. Due to the fact that the amount of allowance 
permits do not change from month to month, the 
values are compiled annually and are represented as 
a constant value for each month in a given year. Since 
the allowance cap determines the supply of SO2 
permits, I predict that, keeping all else constant, an 
increase in supply will cause the price for SO2 per-
mits to fall.
 In order to predict price movements of SO2 
permit prices over time, I will be utilizing two regres-
sion analysis equations. My models are as follows:
natural gas prices, U.S. Coal Price Index, and the 
Drought Index were found to be significant at the 
99% confidence interval. The unemployment rate, 
temperature index, and SO2 allowance cap were all 
found to be insignificant at the 90% confidence inter-
val. However, except for the Temperature Index, all 
of the coefficients of the variables have the expected 
sign. The R-Squared came out to .543, indicating that 
the variance of the dependent variable is relatively 
appropriate for the statistical model. The variables 
that were found to have the greatest impact on the 
price of SO2 permits are the US natural gas prices, 
drought index, and the US coal price index, respec-
tively. Comparatively speaking, the results suggests 
that a one dollar monthly increase in the price of 
natural gas prices raises the SO2 allowance permits 
price by 12.9%, a one dollar monthly increase in the 
price of the US coal price index raises the SO2 per-
mit prices by 2.1%, and a one unit monthly increase 
in the drought index decreases the SO2 permit prices 
by 6.8%.
 In Model 2, the results are ultimately the 
same with the exception that the dependent variable, 
SO2 prices, is not in logarithmic form. 
 Model 1 will be utilized to explain percent-
age effects that the price determinants will have on 
the prices of SO2 allowance permits, barring their 
significance. Model 2 will serve its purpose to predict 
the average price of the SO2 permits and the effect 
the price determinants will have on price movements 
of SO2 permit prices.
VI. Results
 In Model 1, the results of the market deter-
minants are mixed. As shown in Table 1, the U.S. 
Otherwise, Table 2 below shows that US natu-
ral gas prices, US coal prices, and the drought 
index are the only significant variables, all at 
the 99% confidence interval. Comparatively, 
the results suggest that a one dollar monthly 
increase in Real US natural gas prices increas-
es SO2 permit prices by about 42.78 dollars, 
a one dollar monthly increase in Real US coal 
prices increases SO2 permit prices by about 
9.58 dollars, and a one unit monthly increase 
in the drought index decreases SO2 permit 
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prices by about 16.20 dollars. The values derived in 
this section are extremely telling because they will 
help determine the effect to which movements in 
their prices affect the price sensitivity of SO2 permit 
prices.
 In order to predict the average price of SO2 
permits and to measure the price movements of SO2 
permits as a result of the given price determinants, I 
created Table 3. Simulation Results below that shows 
the average price and the respective plus or minus 
standard deviations from the mean of the significant 
variables. To better understand the mathematical 
process, the illustration of the three equations that 
helped derive my values can be found in the Appen-
dix.
 Next, I used the mean values of each of the 
independent variables (from the descriptive statistics 
table below) and inserted them into my empirical 
model and multiplied them with their respective 
unstandardized beta coefficients to derive the average 
SO2 price. The average predicted SO2 price came out 
to $258.12. The standard deviated prices in Table 3. 
Simulation Results represent the amount of disper-
sion from the mean and are compelling because they 
quantify the extent to which each variable’s varia-
tion in price has on the predicted SO2 price. As US 
natural gas prices and US coal prices increase relative 
to the mean, the price of SO2 permits also increases. 
This is due in large part to the idea that prices for 
substitutes fuels increase because demand for substi-
tute fuels is also increasing. As a result of increased 
demand, production levels in those power generating 
plants are also increasing. As supply of unused or un-
needed permits attempts to match demand, the price 
of permits will inevitably increase. The drought in-
dex, on the other hand, is a bit more complicated to 
interpret. In Table 3 Simulation Results, the drought 
index has the smallest effect in price variation of SO2 
permits. However, that small underlying effect actu-
ally derives one of the greater meanings of its total 
effect. In periods of time when there is increased 
moisture and precipitation, hydropower plants cap-
ture the energy of falling water to generate electric-
ity. A turbine converts the kinetic energy of falling 
water into mechanical energy, and then a generator 
converts the mechanical energy from the turbine into 
electrical energy. This is a much more efficient way 
of generating power and it releases much less SO2 in 
the atmosphere. However, as already stated, this only 
happens in times of rainfall. Therefore, although the 
variable is highly significant, the effect of the drought 
index is a small percent change. Looking back at 
Table 1, we can see that as the drought index increas-
es (increase in moisture and precipitation levels), this 
reduces SO2 prices by 6.8%. Thus, as Hydropower 
generating plants use more water as a more efficient 
way of generating power, there is no need to buy up 
more allowance permits, as hydropower is a more ef-
ficient alternative and does not create as much emis-
sions.
VII. Conclusion
 The Acid Rain Program is the oldest and 
most storied cap and trade program in U.S. history. 
The application of a market system within the pro-
gram is proven to have positive environmental and 
economic effects. From my research, I found that 
changes in U.S. natural gas prices, U.S. coal prices, 
and the drought index have the largest effects on 
the price of SO2 allowance permits; and although 
my empirical model contains different variables 
than have been measured in the past with other 
research studies, I believe that there is merit to the 
results of my price determinants. The fact that 5 of 
6 signs on the coefficients of my variables came out 
as expected gives confidence to continue furthering 
these research efforts. Nonetheless, the effect of the 
temperature index and the SO2 cap yielded disap-
pointing results, and is a further application that 
should be explored deeper. Although in my initial 
stages I believed that temperature was going to be 
of great importance to capture the effect of season-
able variations on production levels, I quickly found 
out that it was not. The SO2 cap is another variable 
that I believed would play a major role as it is my 
central supply figure in my theoretical supply and 
demand model for allowance permits, but it too did 
not produce the results I had hoped for. In extended 
research I suggest trying to find a way to capture the 
effect of both of these variables because in reality, 
they carry great weight in determining the prices for 
SO2 permits. Under the circumstances that these 
price determinants all have a significant effect on 
permit prices, a derived policy implication could be 
used in developing countries to reduce the industrial 
output of sulfur dioxide.
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 In an attempt to discover a way to reduce 
the effects of sulfuric acid in the atmosphere, a 
groundbreaking concept was born that provided 
an efficient and cost-effective way to reduce the 
emissions and also created an incentive for firms 
to participate in the process. With decreased levels 
of sulfuric acid in the atmosphere and with both 
phase I and phase II decreasing SO2 emissions by 
57% and 14% respectively since 2000, the success of 
this program exceeding initial expectations.
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